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PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION
The rights and responsibilities of students, members of
the faculty, and trustees or regents of state universities and col-
leges are defined to some extent in numerous decisions by the
courts in the various states. The cases collectively form a valu-
able source of the principles heretofore applied in this particu-
lar branch of administrative law, and an indispensable basis for
the consideration of its future development. For convenience
they may be grouped in a threefold classification-those
involving (1) students, (2) faculty members, and (3) the
personnel of the governing board.
STUDENT PERSONNEL
Admission. The trustees of a state institution of higher
education cannot make membership in a Greek-letter fraternity
a positive disqualification for admission as a student unless the
legislature has expressly or impliedly authorized it.1 Where a
state university is given power by the constitution to make rea-
sonable health regulations, it may make and enforce a coinpul-
sory vaccination rule, and deny admission to any persons other-
wise who refuse to comply with it, unless and until the legisla-
ture regulates the subject by positive exercise of its plenary
police power.- In the absence of constitutional or statutory pro-
hibition, a state university may charge and collect an admission
fee to provide a fund for incidental expenses necessary and con-
venient for the attainment of the objects of the institution, such
as the heating and lighting of its public halls, not provided for
at the expense of the state. Where a statute provides that ad-
mission shall be free, collection of a fee for the use of the library,
I State ex re7. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am. Rep. 496 (1882).
As to the effect of an anti-fraternity statute, see Board o1 Trustees of
University of Mississippi v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, L. R. A.
1915 D. 588, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 17, affirmed in Waugh v. Trustees, 237
U. S. 589, 35 S. Ct. 720 (1915).
"Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 138 Pac. 937 (1913);
Wallace v. Regents of University of California, 75 Cal. App. 274, 242
Pac. 892 (1925).
3 State ex rel. Priest v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 54 Wis.
159 (1882).
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and the exclusion from the library of students -who refuse to pay
the fee, has been held unlawful.
4
Miscellaneous Fees and Deposits. Exaction of deposits to
cover possible negligent breakage or damage to university prop-
erty, or for the use of a prescribed uniform, such deposits to be
returned at the end of the term or session if not consumed, is
within the powers of the governing board, acting under a gen-
eral legislative grant.5 But the requirements of fees from all
matriculants, to be applied to the support of the Y. A. C. A.,
Y. W. C. A., athletic associations, literary societies, and student
publications, is beyond the powers of the governing board of a
state institution.6 In the absence of constitutional limitations,
the state legislature has power to prescribe fees to be collected
from all students for entrance, tuition, or incidental expenses,
and may apply the proceeds to the erection and equipment of
buildings on the campus.7 The right of a state to charge
higher fees to non-residents than are exacted from its own citi-
zens who become students in its institutions of higher education
is undisputed.s However, the ultimate soundness of the policy
of discrimination against nonresidents is open to question.9
Hou ing. The weight of judicial opinion favors the con-
stitutionality of legislative acts authorizing the construction of
dormitories and students' activity buildings to be financed solely
out of rentals accruing from the use thereof, on the amortiza-
tion plan. and ultimately to become the property of the state
upon the completion of the payment of all contract charges for
construction and equipment.' 0 A fraternity chapter has been
held to be primarily an organization for the rooming and
IState ex rel. Little v. Regents of University of Kansas, 55 Kan.
389, 40 Pac. 656, 29 L. R. A.. 378 (1895).
'Davison-Nicholson Co. v. Pound, 147 Ga. 447, 94 S. E. 560 (1917).
Connell v. Gray. 33 Okla. 591, 127 Pac. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914 B. 399,
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 336 (1912).
Litchman v. Shannon. 90 Wash. 186, 155 Pac. 783 (1916).
'Bryan v. Regents of University of California, 188 Cal. 559, 205 Pac.
1017 (1922).
1 See Spencer, Carlton E., "The Legal Aspects of the Non-Resident
Tuition Fee." 6 Oregon Law Review 332 (June, 1927); also published
concurrently in 33 West Virginia Law Quarterly 350.
1 McLain v. Regents of University of Oregon, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac.
412 (1928); Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis. 518, 220 N. W. 816 (1928);
Wilder v. Murphy, .56 N. D. 436, 218 N. W. 156 (1928); State v. Davis,
59 N. D. 191, 229 N. W. 105 (1930). See Viesselman, P. W., and Ber-
genthal, C., "Private Financing of State University Buildings." 2
Dakota Law Review 288 (December, 1928).
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boarding of students, and not entitled to exemption from taxa-
tion as a scientific, literary, or educational institution, unless a
statute expressly and unequivocally exempts it." It has been
held that even if the donation of a building to a state university
creates a trust limiting its use to the rooming and boarding of
students, continuous use of it for the designated purpose for
thirty-six years would constitute full performance of the trust,
and the governing board would then be entitled to convert it to
another use for educational purposes. 12 An occupant of a room
in a college dormitory'has not the legal rights of an ordinary
tenant of real property, nor even those of a lodger; and by
taking up residence there he impliedly agrees to conform to all
reasonable rules and regulations then in force or thereafter
adopted by the proper authorities, who may, when the circum-
stances make it reasonably necessary, expel him therefrom sum-
marily.13
Liability for Injuries to Students. The state has no liabil-
ity for injuries to students resulting from the negligence of
employees of a state institution, unless it voluntarily assumes
such liability, which it may do by legislative act, in the absence
of any constitutional prohibition.14 An infirmary or hospital
conducted in connection with a state university, even though
fees be charged and profits made from the sale of its services,
is classified as a purely public or governmental activity, in which
the governing board is not responsible for the torts of its
employees, and students negligently injured thereby are remedi-
less except as against the person responsible for the injury.35
Discipline and Dismissal. The courts will not interfere
with the reasonable exercise of disciplinary authority by univer-
sity or college officers in the absence of any showing that it is
exercised arbitrarily, fraudulently, in bad faith, or with
3
1 Inhabitants of Orono v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Society, 105 Me. 214,
74 Atl. 19 (1909). See Chamberlain, Vell B., "Tax Exemption of Greek-
Letter Fraternities." 4 Cincinnati Law 2teview 186 (March, 1930); and
Tuttrus, R. R., "Eligibility of Fraternities to Exemption from the Prop-
erty Tax Under Wisconsin Statutes." 4 Wisconsin Law Review 223
(1927).
1Splawn v. Woodard (Tex. Civ. App.), 287 S. W. 677 (1927).
U3Bnglehart v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263, 300 S. W. 268 (1927).
'
4Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (1926).
25 Davis v. Regents of the University of California, 66 Cal. App. 693,
227 Pac. 243 (1924).
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malice.16 The president of the institution may enforce proper
administrative regulations enacted by the governing board, in-
cluding those designed to promote and protect a decent stand-
ard of moral and social conduct among students, to the extent of
suspending or expelling offenders for the good of the institu-
tion. 17 The relation between the institution and a matriculated
student is contractual, and the law will protect the student
against arbitrary dismissal.1 8 In cases of suspension or expul-
sion, the accused student is entitled to a hearing before the
administrative authorities of the institution, but such hearing
need not possess all the formal characteristics of a court pro-
ceeding. 19 If the student is fully apprised of the information
against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his con-
duct, this constitutes a sufficient hearing, without such formali-
ties as the filing of written charges, the summoning of witnesses
to give sworn testimony, and the giving to the accused the priv-
ilege of confronting all witnesses against him and of hearing
their testimony in person and of cross-examining them.20
Although the law does not require a hearing as formal as a
court proceeding, administrative officers may avoid needless liti-
gation by handling suspension and expulsion cases with due
regard for the rights and feelings of all concerned, and with
especial care to forestall the allegation of condemnation upon
mere suspicion, or upon insufficient evidence, or after a proceed-
ing too informal even to meet the minimum requirements of the
law as above outlined.2'
FACULTY PERONNXEL
Status and Tenure. Professors in state universities and
20 See Sloan, George E. "Discipline and State-Owned Educational In-
stitutions", 97 Central Law Journal 187; Hurley, James D., "Colleges:
Nature of Relation to Student: Right of Dismissal", 13 Cornell Law
Quarterly 85 (December, 1927); Pennypacker, 12 Virginia Law Review
645 (June, 1926).
II State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928);
certiorari denied, 48 S. Ct. 528, 277 U. S. 591; writ of error refused, 49
S. Ct. 7.
11 Goldstein v. New York University, 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N. Y. S. 739
(1903).
"Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 AtI. 882, 39 A. L. R. 1016
(1924).
Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N. W. 510, 33 A. I,. R.
1175 (1924).
- Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Galen in State ex rel. Ingersoll
v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928).
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colleges are not public officers, but employees of public corpora-
tions, with rights and duties derived from the contract which
is the basis of their employment. 22 Professional tenure is made
insecure in many state institutions by statutes of the state or
ordinances of the governing board making professors removable
at the pleasure of the board, or whenever the board determines
that the interests of the institution require it.23 Where a statute
empowered the governing board to remove any professor without
previous notice whenever in its judgment the interests of the
university required it, one line of judicial opinion holds that the
board was without power to contract with an instructor that his
separation from the service at the instance of either party would
be preceded by three months' notice.24 Another and seemingly
better line of judicial reasoning holds that under a similar stat-
ute the board can make such a covenant with an instructor with-
out impairing its power to dismiss him without notice, but
thereby renders itself liable for the amount of his salary for
three months if it exercises its power to disregard the covenant
and dismisses him summarily.25 Where a statute empowers the
board to appoint and remove professors without limitation as
to time, it has been held that a contract employing a professor
for two and one-half years was not for an unreasonably long
period of tenure.2 6
Compensation. A state university teacher's right to his
pay is governed by the well-established principles of the law
of contracts, except as modified by statute.2 7 Employment of a
professor for a "year" has been held to mean the traditional
academic year and not a full calendar year, in the absence of
evidence of any understanding to the contrary, and the fact
that the professor spent the summer in the employ of another
22Butler v. Regents 32 Wis. 124 (1873); Hartigan v. Regents, 49
W. Va. 14, 38 S. E. 698 (1901). Contra, Head v. Curators of University
of Misosuri, 47 Mo. 220 (1871); Vincenheller v. Reagan, 69 Ark. 460,
64 S. W. 278 (1901), Mr. Chief Justice Bunn dissenting.
University of Mississippi v. Deister, 76 So. 526, 115 Miss. 469(1917) ;Hyslop v. Regents of University of Idaho, 23 Ida. 341, 129 Pac.
1073 (1913).
-4 Devol v. Regents of University of Arizona, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 Pac. 737
(1899).
2 Kansas State Agricultural College v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878).
-'Ward v. Regents of Kansas State Agricultural College, 138 Fed.
372, 70 C. C. A. 512 (1905).
21 Trustees of University of Alabama v. Walden, 15 Ala. 655 (1894).
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university did not impair his right to recover his full salary for
the year.28 Professors engaging in extra-mural activities to sup-
plement their incomes are within their rights unless the con-
tract of employment forbids such activities, so long as they do
not compete with the institution by which they are employed, or
act in opposition to its interests.
29
THE PERSONNEL OF THE GOVERNING BOARD
Selection and Tenure. Where the constitution requires that
members of the governing board be elected by the people of the
state, and a statute adds an elective state officer to the board
as an ex-officio member thereof, such elective state officer, having
been elected prior to the enactment of the statute, is not entitled
to a seat on the board during his current term, because such
seat could not have been contemplated as an incident of his
office when he was elected. 30 It has been held by a division of
the court that where a newly enacted statute provides for
appointment of members of the governing board by the governor
of the state with the advice and consent of the senate, such
appointments are not irregular merely because the governor
sent the names of his nominees to the senate for confirmation
before the statute was passed. 31 When the constitution or stat-
utes provide a fixed term of office for members of the govern-
ing board, and contain no "hold-over clause" specifying that
they shall continue in office until their successors shall be
appointed and qualified, their tenure terminates upon the expira-
tion of the fixed term, even though this occur at a time (as
when the senate is not in session) when regular appointments of
their successors cannot be made in the manner prescribed by
law.32
Manner of Removal. In the absence of constitutional lim-
itations, the power of the legislature to prescribe by statute the
23 Trustees of University of IlZionis v. Bruner, 66 Ill. App. 665,
affirmed 175 II. 307, 51 N. E. 687 (1898).
" 11 Corpus Juris 996, citing cases.
10 State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, Attorney General, 21 Nev. 517,
34 Pac. 870 (1893).
"S State ex rel. Langer v. Crawford, 36 N. D. 385, 162 N. W. 710
(1917).
"State ex rel. Wood v. Sheldon, 8 S. D. 525, 67 N. W. 613 (1896);
State ex rel. Langer v. Scow (N. D.), 164 N. W. 939 (1917). For the
effect of a "hold-over clause," see State ex rel. Little v. Foster, 130 Ala.
154, 30 So. 477 (1901).
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method of removal of members of governing boards is complete,
and it may provide for their summary removal without notice
or hearing; but where the statutes give to some administrative
authority the power to remove, not at pleasure nor at its dis-
cretion, but for cause, and are silent as to the procedure to be
followed, a specification of the charges, notice, and opportunity
to be heard are essential.33 In the absence of statutory pro-
vision for the termination of his tenure by mere neglect or
abuse, or by some expressly prescribed method of removal
(which may be summary), a member of the governing board
cannot be deprived of his seat until the authority competent to
remove him has given him reasonable notice and opportunity
for hearing, investigated the facts, and determined his forfeit-
ure of right to the office.3 4 The power of removal is not a
necessary incident of a limited power of appointment which the
legislature has conferred upon the governor of the state. 35 It
has been held that where a statute empowers the governor to
remove members of the governing board whenever he is satisfied
that they have been guilty of misconduct or malfeasance in
office or are incompetent, and directs that he shall file with the
secretary of state a statement showing his reasons with his order
of removal, such statement is sufficient if it merely states his
conclusions, omitting any mention of the specific facts on which
they are based.3 6 In this instance a minority of the court
opposed the decision both on grounds of law and of policy, and
marshalled cogent reasoning and imposing authority in support
of its dissenting position.
37
The increasing importance of public higher education
affords an impetus to the study of the personnel problems which
arise in its administration. Much remains to be done toward
the building of an adequate body of knowledge to serve as a
basis for wise legislation, constructive modification of judicial
precedents, and the development of sound administrative
policies. M M. CHAMBRS.
3state ex re7. Hitchcock v. Hewitt et al., 3 S. D. 187, 52 N. W. 875,
44 Am. S. R. 788, 16 L. R. A. 413 (1892)
S3 State ex rel. Linley v. Bryce, 7 Oh. St. (pt. II) 82 (1836).
"Lewis v. Whittle, 77 Va. 415 (1883).
"State ex reZ. Davis v. Johns, 139 Wash. 525, 248 Pac. 423 (1926).
11 See the dissenting opinion in the preceding case, written by
Askren, J., and concurred in by Main and Bridges, JJ., especially the
quotation therein from Hoffman v. Yoe, 9 Kan. App. 394,* 58 Pac. 802,
reversed in Yoe v. Hoffman, McDowe v. Limbocker, 61 Kan. 265, 59
Pac. 351 (1899).
